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Habit is the ballast that chains the dog to his vomit. 
Samuel Beckett1 
Deconstruction provides, I will argue, a consistent theory of the necessary conditions for the 
organisation of any identity or being.  Ravaisson’s theory of habit, as articulated in Of Habit, will 
provide a useful foil for demonstrating the central conceptual distinctions necessary for thinking 
a philosophically rigorous theory of deconstruction. Comparing Jacques Derrida and Felix 
Ravaisson is invaluable as it allow us grasp a number of important concepts for understanding 
deconstruction’s contribution to the question of life. Investigating the question of habit, 
structure, time, repetition and change in Ravaisson, allows us to see the extent to which these 
are utilised and transgressed in Derrida. What is interesting is not least the extent to which it 
allows us to explicate the degree Vitalism or spiritualism may be present in Derrida’s thought. 
This is important as most contemporary debates on the question of life and matter, as well as 
the biopolitical tends to be primarily based in the Bergsonian-Deleuzian, as well a Foucauldian 
constellation.  Derrida I claim offers many original insights to understanding the limits and 
possibilities of understanding the question of life, one that emerges from the ground up, in the 
relation between organisms, structures and identities.  The importance of staging a 
confrontation between Derrida and Ravaisson is to assert that Ravaisson’s vitalistic monism 
needs to be rigorously enhanced, with a thinking of life that requires an originary relation to 
death, time, technicity and alterity.  My claim is that to think the life of any entity for 
deconstruction implies a gathering together of life in singularity and localization, and at one and 
the same time an exposure to alterity. In the last analysis, an importance consequence of my 
argument is that a deconstructive Vitalism is impossible from the start, needing the corrective 
of deconstruction to be logically feasible.  
Section 1: Derrida, Ravaisson and the Habit of Life  
How does Derrida respond to the question of life? Spiritualism and Vitalism are valuable 
concepts for helping position his work in response to some recent trends in contemporary 
European Philosophy. The ‘philosophies of life’ from the beginning of the century have recently 
gained purchase over current intellectual configurations. This is evident in work revitalizing 
Henri Bergson, in the proliferation of Deleuze scholarship, in the vitalist politics of Michel Hardt 
and Tony Negri, and in Michel Foucault’s reflections on bio-power. Thematically, this 
intellectual constellation revolves around Spinozistic, Bergsonian and Nietzschean reflections 
on scientific spiritualisms.  The ‘philosophies of life’ are defined by the affirmative, the inventive 
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and the creative; increasingly, they are becoming by-words for generosity, liberation, openness 
and freedom. This can be seen, for example, in the spirit of Bergson’s own élan vital. Life is 
valorised by these philosophies as holding a redemptive capacity, and when embraced, 
banishes all forms of negation, death and destruction.  This alerts us to the initial problem of 
placing Derrida within this constellation. For Derrida, the opposition of life and death is a false 
opposition. Much of Derrida’s work has in one way or another signified an attempt to theorise 
how and why life and death are entangled.  
It would however be difficult to argue Derrida is utterly inimical to the vitalist tradition. As has 
been argued extensively by a variety of scholars, most recently Leonard Lawlor, Derrida he 
claims radicalizes key moments in Husserlian phenomenology to achieve an ‘ultra-
transcendental’ concept of life.2  However, the concept of life, and its philosophical lineage in 
the vitalist tradition, is something Derrida does not take up in and of itself, but only ever in 
terms of complications and distancing. Derrida’s thought can at least on face value be seen as 
beginning of strong negation of Vitalism. Life cannot be localized to any entity, localised species 
or biological organism. Life is, for Derrida, always irreducibly open to a necessary contingency 
and hence, no individuated form of life in particular can be purely life and thus never only life 
as such. It is Derrida’s comments on Ravaisson which will help us to isolate the philosophical 
reasons for this disengagement from vitalism, and which will help us understand the positive 
theorisation of deconstruction in terms of the entanglement of notions of life and death.  For 
this reason it is necessary to begin with a general exposition of Ravaisson’s key concepts of 
space, time, habit and general of ontology order to establish how they might pertain to Derrida.  
Ravaisson’s De L’Habitude offers a wonderfully dynamic and succinct theory of habit.  Ravaisson 
condenses a number of themes from the history of philosophy into a radical theory of 
generalized habit.  Interlacing themes from Aristotle, Leibniz, De Biran and Schelling, he creates 
a vitalist and radically metaphysical account of habit.3  What defines habit for Ravaisson is that 
a habit occurs at the intersection of both activity and passivity.  For Ravaisson: “...everywhere, 
in every circumstance, continuity or repetition – that is, duration – weakens passivity and 
excites activity.” (OH 49) Without change there is no habit; or, stated more positively, a habit 
cannot be formed that is incapable of change from its inception.  In biological terms, the 
formation of habit occurs along a continuum from plant to animal to conscious human life, from 
the inorganic realm to the organic.  However, as Ravaisson states in the opening remarks of his 
essay, he is not just concerned with specific habits.  Habit is not simply or solely an acquired 
habit, such as smoking or leaving the toilet seat up. Habit exists because it is the consequence 
of a change.  For Ravaisson, “...what we especially intend by the word ‘habit,’ which is the 
subject of this study, is not simply acquired habit, but habit that is contracted, owing to a 
change, with respect to every change that gave birth to it.” (OH 25)  There are two points that 
we can take from this general definition.  Firstly, habit names the relative unity of a body in the 
face of the content of its successive phases. Secondly, this alerts us to what Ravaisson takes to 
be the essential mutual implication of change and permanence in the constitution of habit. This 
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provides a general definition of habit which is not absolute.  Habits are only ever a relative unity.  
For Ravaisson, habit is therefore not everlasting or eternal.4 Habits come and go, and thus they 
only have a temporary unity.  Indeed, for Ravaisson, ‘habit is a change which remains the same.’ 
(OH 25)   The permanence attributed to habit is relative to the change to which the body 
undergoing habit formation is exposed.  
Ravaisson’s examples are instructive in showing how he understands habit, and also in 
explaining how difference and sameness are metaphysical requisites for the creation of habit.  
Ravaisson speaks of the difference in sensations between a connoisseur and a binge drinker. 
The sensations of the binge drinker are wholly devoted to consuming alcohol in whatever form 
it comes, and are thus wholly devoted to the experience of indiscriminate and successive 
impressions.  Hence, there is no repetition of the sensation of any particular beverage; there is 
only the taste of indiscriminate impressions.   The connoisseur, on the other hand, is the one 
who actively discriminates between impressions, thereby introducing a repetition of change or 
sameness into the consumption of alcoholic drinks. The repetition of change dims the 
experience of innumerable sensations or impressions, allowing the connoisseur to habituate 
herself to the nuances of different alcoholic beverages.   
Ravaisson considers habit in the widest possible sense. Habit is relevant to the most momentary 
impressions of desire, to the habits of a lifetime, to the habituality of a cell in one’s body 
stabilising its own identity.  Indeed habit, for Ravaisson, is “all the way up and all the way down,” 
from the lowest organism to the principle of life itself.  Put speculatively, a being is the 
coalescence of innumerable habits entering into relations. More abstractly, this corresponds to 
how Ravaisson understands the conditions of space and time.  Space is characterised by its 
ability to remain and is thus passive; on the other hand, time is characterised by its ability to 
change and remains active.  We should not think about these concepts in simple empirical 
terms, but rather in loosely Kantian terms.5  Space and time are prerequisite conditions for a 
body to accrue habituation; they are bodies’ essential conditions of possibility.  Whether a habit 
takes place in this or that space, or in this or that time, is irrelevant: what is important is that 
habit is time and space.  Habit is not this particular spatial content or that particular temporal 
quality, but an absolute prerequisite for the relative ordering of a body in general.  Thus, for 
any being to exist, it must therefore be unambiguously characterised by sameness and 
difference, since space characterises the relative stability of a being and time characterises the 
ability to transform and change.6   
Across the continuum of nature, from the most high to the lowest, if there is a being, then it 
must be a being which has a relatively intransigent unity through time.  This coalescence is 
necessary for the production of any bodily life.  However, habit cannot constitute bodies in 
relation to just any individuated habit formation.  For Ravaisson, it follows that the creation of 
life most actively takes place in the organic realm.  The inorganic realm is therefore the realm 
of ‘death.’  It is not a realm of life because there is no change with respect to the sameness of 
any unity.  The inroganic is nothing other than a homogeneous whole without differentiation.  
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There is no individuating dynamic which could subject an organic entity to both change and 
duration, and thus there can be no creation of life.    In the inorganic realm, external changes 
become less effective and new formations cannot retain a disposition towards equilibrium.  
Conversely, the more a living being is alive, the more it repeats changes, and by extension the 
more impact it has on its identity and development.  This is not the case for, say, a stone, which 
is not as active as an organic being with motility.   
For every identity, the law of habit applies.  Ravaisson provides a succinct description of this in 
the context of being affected by passions and actions:  
The continuity or the repetition of passions weakens it; the continuity or repetition of 
actions exalts and strengthens it.  Prolonged or repeated sensation diminishes gradually 
and eventually fades away.  Prolonged or repeated movement becomes gradually easier, 
quicker and more assured.  Perception, which is linked to movement, similarly becomes 
clearer, swifter, and more certain. (OH 49) 
The most attractive feature of considering habit in terms of activity and passivity is that habit 
need not be absolute.  For Ravaisson certainly all of nature lies along one vital continuum, but 
localised habits are relatively finite.  Localised bodies require an adaptive ability, and are thus 
founded on a localised suitability within an environment. Each living being draws support and 
sustenance in direct proportion to its environment or context of involvement.  Living bodies are 
by virtue of both their stability and their capacity to adapt.  This is framed precisely within the 
terms of the classical concept of individuation.  What makes a living being the living being that 
it is - which is to say what makes it distinct - is the very relational process to which a living body 
is susceptible with respect to the external world, whilst remaining simultaneously relatively 
distinct within itself.  Ravaisson remains, in the last analysis, a quintessential vitalist.  An account 
of habit must be founded on an absolute demarcation of the organic and inorganic.  As he states 
unambiguously, “habit is not possible within the inorganic realm.”(OH, 27) Thus, he rules out 
any mechanistic or materialistic account of habit tout court.  This is not to say that that matter 
does not affect organisms; only that it is not primary.  Matter is inert and therefore dead, and 
exists in an absolutely homogenous inorganic space.  Such is the world of Newtonian absolute 
time and space and its laws; life therefore for Ravaisson must transcend this.  Habit, for 
Ravaisson, allows passage between the inanimate and animate, between the ideal and the 
material, and between living beings and matter. The negotiation between materialistic and 
unmaterialistic thought here comes to the fore.  Both organic life and inorganic matter are 
mutually transformed through their engagement with each other, with habit being the 
animation of inert matter. The basic point is that habit, for Ravaisson, allows the opening of 
matter to the activity of life, along with the imposition of identity on life by the structure of the 
material world.  As we will see, Derrida argues that this point is important but over-encumbered 
in the direction of life, with Derrida ultimately arguing that for Ravaisson habit is distinguished 
from basic matter. Life and spirit, Derrida argues, for Ravaisson, holds an undeserved hierarchy 
and pre-eminence.  
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Philosophically, what is at stake in Ravaisson’s dichotomy between the organic and the 
inorganic is the old Aristotelian distinction between accidental and essential change.  If an 
object undergoes essential change it therefore no longer exists – as can be seen, for example, 
when a house burns down.  Accidental change entails that change is not of an essential nature, 
to such a degree that only parts of the house would change, i.e. a new coat of paint or a cracked 
kitchen tile.  What Ravaisson has achieved, building on this, is to place both the accidental and 
the essential on the same continuum.  Both are now essential for understanding the process of 
habit formation. Habit is both an acquired and a dynamic way of being for an object.  A habit is 
thus a “general and permanent way of being, the state of an existence considered either as the 
unity of its elements or as the succession of its different phases.” (OH, 27) Ravaisson is quite 
decisive about this: “Nothing, then, is capable of habit that is not capable of change; but 
everything capable of change is not by that fact alone capable of habit.” (OH, 25)  Habit is 
essentially a change which retains a relative durability. Ravaisson’s general ontology is stated 
in an exceptionally clear manner in the opening pages of Of Habit.  Habit is the process of 
remaining the same while at one and the same time retaining difference.  A relative unity is 
what Ravaisson calls a state or a disposition.  This disposition is defined by Ravaisson as the co-
implication of space and time or change and permanence: 
The universal law, the fundamental character of a being, is the tendency to persist in its 
way of being.  The conditions under which being is represented to us in the world are 
Space and Time.  Space is the condition and the most apparent and elementary form of 
stability, of permanence; time is the universal condition of change.  The simplest change, 
and the most general, is also that which is relative to space itself, namely movement. (OH 
27) 
If there is no space and time then habit can neither begin nor unravel.  Space is that aspect of a 
habit which allows it to remain the same; time is the aspect which allows it minimally to change.  
A habit becomes a state or a disposition towards or in another sense it is an inclination to.  This 
is what Ravaisson calls the extended mobile, which precisely characterises the general character 
of body.  In this way, Ravaisson resists empirical accounts of habit: for him, it is not empirical 
impressions which are key to the creation of habits, but a repetition of changes which coalesces 
into a temporal unity.  Indeed for Ravaisson, the resolution of sameness and otherness is 
absolutely essential to the formation of any habit.   
Section 2: Hetero-Affection, Technicity and the Death of Life  
Themes such as difference and repetition, sameness and change, time and space, are the nexus 
of Derrida’s many reflections across his career.  The manner in which Derrida deploys them with 
regard questions of life and death requires a radical rethinking of the tradition of life philosophy. 
Life philosophy is self-generating, whereby life can only generate life. Derrida thinks to 
understand life it must be a species of non-life or alterity.  The opposition of life and death, and 
indeed the organic and the mechanical are false dichotomies.  What separates Derrida most 
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obviously from Vitalism, is that for Derrida Vitalism can only ever remain a species of auto-
affection. Auto-affection is the process whereby an identity self-generates itself. It implies that 
identity is homogenous and self-same. 
 Derrida works out this notion in a variety of contexts, most famously in his analysis of the 
interior monologue and meaning in Voice and Phenomenon.7  Basically, there cannot be auto-
affection tout court, there can only be hetero-affection. Put another way, there is contaminated 
auto-affection, which is an impossibility, as such, since auto-affection cannot sustain or 
generate life beyond itself. The vitalist position, as we see exemplified in Ravaisson, is one that 
is a type of auto-affection, since any contact with the inorganic is grounded in prior force or 
spirit. There is therefore in the vitalist tradition, a misrecognition of hetero-affection which 
avoids the question of death, whereby the alterity of anything that lives is exposed to its own 
dissolution. Derrida asks “Is it not already death at the origin of a life which can defend itself 
against death only through an economy of death through deferment, repetition, reserve?”8 For 
Derrida, the bounds of any identity are never a question of pure life or pure death but an 
intermingling of both. 
For Derrida then, what Ravaisson calls habit, at least on a superficial level, is associated with 
regularity, practices and repetitive forms of unified activity? To be fair, Ravaisson radicalises the 
notion of habit. With regard deconstruction however it is not enough, the differences between 
Derrida and Ravaisson are most palpable in Ravaisson’s brutal dichotomy between the organic 
and the inorganic.9 Much of Derrida’s work is committed to undermining the dichotomy of 
organic and inorganic, especially if the inorganic is on the side of brute necessity.  There is, as 
we will see, no absolute demarcation between life and death for Derrida.  For Derrida, the 
philosophical task is to achieve a negotiation of the relation between the organic and the 
inorganic.  Traditionally the organic and inorganic are in tension, with the organic associated 
with life and all that is spontaneous, creative and new, and the inorganic being a facet of death 
and all that is mechanical, inert and repetitive. After all, the basic vitalist opposition is between 
living organisms that are organized spiritually and remain radically distinct from inorganic 
things. Lawlor points out precisely the importance for Derrida of the relation between the 
inorganic and organic for questions of life and death, showing that while these two concepts 
appear antinomical, their interrelation requires a description of the mechanical production of 
life, or a blending of the spontaneous and the mechanical. The stakes of negotiating this division 
introduce a radically new conceptual truth, the negotiation of which, I will claim is 
deconstruction.10 Derrida’s critique of Ravaisson reveals the central principles necessary to 
think any deconstruction.   
When Derrida speaks of deathly concepts such as phantasm, haunting and the spectral, he is 
merely describing the cycle of how organic matter emerges from inorganic matter and returns 
to inorganic matter.11 This is the limits of what Derrida calls survival, what comes to life returns 
to death.   Thus one of the key features of what Derrida’s critique aims at the co-implication of 
life and death in what he calls originary technicity. Originary technicity is the term Derrida uses 
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to demonstrate that the opposition of life and death, the natural and the cultural, and the 
biological and inorganic are not adequate since in some sense, life is always already mechanized 
or technical.  The attempt to separate these terms leads to the most limited forms of monistic 
auto-affection or self-relation. This is the worst type of thought since thinking must demand 
alterity and relation. The effort to conjoin the technical requires us to rethink a number of things 
we inherit from the vitalist tradition, and it is this which Derrida’s analysis aims at. 
Deconstruction, I claim, is an attempt to discern the extent any being cannot merely be the 
process of a recalcitrant will or force, desperately animating the continuation of existence. 
Instead, life requires a degree of mechanical and automatic repetition that delimits and 
localises existing things. Derrida’s critique of Ravaisson entails an entity that survives or persists 
repeats itself, but does so, in exposure to a world of space, events, matter.  
A cursory review of Derrida’s oeuvre confirms the separation of the organic and the inorganic 
criticised in numerous contexts. We see inorganic technicity in the role of writing in his earliest 
work, in the co-implication of life and death in différance, in the tension between the 
quantitative and the qualitative in Rogues, in iterability, in the customary automaticity of the 
phallus in Faith and Knowledge, and in the originary technicity that is demonstrated in Without 
Alibi. Habit itself even in Derrida always requires an inorganic supplement.  In works such as 
Psyche, The Politics of Friendship, The Gift of Death, and his various writings on hospitality, we 
see Derrida neuter the habitual regularity of a community with his commitment to the 
negotiations of a radical alterity.  Habit features fleetingly in all these texts.  Derrida usually 
categorises it as that which ties thought to the regulated, the ordinary and the mundane, and 
which resists the arrivant, and the wholly other; habit thus remains restricted to the 
quotidian.12  But for our purposes, the general point stands: habit cannot be vitalistic purely in 
itself, because it must be exposed to a form of alterity to count as habit at all.   
Catherine Malabou, in the preface to the English translation of Of Habit, provides a helpful 
starting point regarding Derrida’s relation to Ravaisson’s Vitalism. This lens begins to be 
elucidated by the essential dichotomy between mechanism and freedom. (OH, vii)  This 
dichotomy grounds the separation of the organic and the inorganic, and it is precisely what 
Derrida subverts. As Malabou notes, the most prominent instance of this collapse is evident in 
On Touching, in which Derrida firmly describes the opposition between habit as ontology or 
mechanized routine as being two species of the same metaphysical auto-affection. For Derrida, 
both traditions subscribe to the metaphysics of presence. (OH xii) Malabou makes some telling 
points chastising Derrida for delimiting some of the more ‘deconstructive’ aspects of 
Ravaisson’s thought.  She suggests Derrida undermines the language of contamination and 
parasitical in Ravaisson, and ultimately Ravaisson’s notion of habit should be understood in the 
same sense that Derrida understands the pharmakon as both poison and cure, where a habit is 
precisely exposed to an external change that defines it. (OH ixx-xx)  Malabou is correct to say 
that habits can be at once both good and bad.  We can have an illness or an addiction, we can 
develop a taste for foods which we do not like, and we can even build resistance to the 
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introduction of toxins to our systems.  However, Malabou’s assertion only goes so far in allowing 
us to think deconstruction.  Thinking deconstruction demands that it is done speculatively, since 
it presents the formal coordinates for any identity or body being there. Deconstruction and 
différance name the temporal and spatial formal conditions in which any being can exist. This 
must be applied to habit as much as to any other identity.  Derrida’s deconstruction comprises 
the emergence of any being, including habit itself; Malabou is therefore correct in saying that 
Ravaisson offers a general ontology of habit, but for Derrida habit is just one being among many, 
as susceptible to deconstruction as anything else. To conceive of deconstruction in these terms 
is to conceive of it as always at work, happening, irrespective of the being or entity which is at 
hand. If this is the case then we cannot take any one object, be it biological, physical or chemical, 
and apply that to the entire metaphysical realm of Being.  
Malabou locates Derrida’s scepticism towards monism in the auto-affection of the subject. 
Derrida, however, has a broader target, namely to undermine the onto-theological immanence 
of spiritualism and vitalistic creationism.  In On Touching, he situates Ravaisson in the tradition 
of Maine de Biran, a tradition which creates a transcendental ‘personalism,’ one which endorses 
a hierarchical complexity of beings.13 In essence, one moves from the world of dead necessity 
and physical objects to plants, animals, to human consciousness, and so on to God.  All these 
innumerable spheres are part of a monistic continuum from death to life and back again. 
For Derrida, another more serious point emerges from these reflections. There remains a 
singular problem with Ravaisson’s conception of habit.  The emergence of a habit must be 
grounded on a continuum in which all individuated beings exist on a single plane of immanence.  
Why? Because in Aristotelian terms, all bodies are substances, and a class of entelechia, which 
to say all bodies are developmental stages of one total and vital substance geared towards a 
unitary end. So, while habit can be local and finite, it still derives its existence from one dynamic 
substance, or creative spirit in vitalistic terms.  All beings that exist on the continuum of nature 
are onto-theological in the sense that Derrida understands the theological nature of any 
metaphysical ontology; as a genesis that can only be understood in terms of a trans-ontological 
being, a being that can only experience itself in an ever proliferating variety of contexts, or as a 
being that nourishes itself without remainder or loss, and in all its mutations remains utterly 
proximate to itself. Derrida astutely identifies how movement and transformation for Ravaisson 
are not wholly relative to specific or singular beings, but are rather the effect of, and dependent 
upon, a prior spiritual continuum.  Human consciousness is a particular and exemplary 
instantiation of this dynamic continuum.  For example, human consciousness for Ravaisson 
exemplifies the best instance of human freedom between the realm of homogeneous necessity 
and the realm of the divine spirit immanent to nature.  Such psychic unity remains a species of 
ideal auto-affective subjectivity.  Specifically, within the realm of consciousness, all difference, 
change and spontaneity are grounded in the illusion of a ‘self.’ One might argue in defence of 
Ravaisson that consciousness and personal identity are in fact constituted by difference, all 
along the spiritual continuum of desire. Space, time dispersion and habit all correspond, 
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however, to a single movement. If there is a continuum then localized instances of habit must 
be connected to others.  The auto-affection of subjectivity that Derrida mentions above submits 
to the most traditional form of idealism, where the realm of nature is isomorphic to 
consciousness. This is the creative force of spiritual Vitalism. Consciousness transcends and 
exceeds local forces and bodily motor activity since it participates in a prior force.  
Transcendental personalism individuates itself out of a prior spiritualistic force.  Consciousness 
itself is therefore a particular manifestation of a prior homogenous unity.  Consciousness 
‘envelops’ the activity of perception and sensation. Derrida shows how the specific example of 
motor activity becomes enveloped by a broader spiritualistic force which generates 
consciousness:  
The ones that matter to us here have to do with motor activity, effort, and touching.  If 
movement presupposes a power exceeding resistance and can be measured by the 
consciousness of the effort that thus envelops activity and passivity.  Effort situates the 
locus of equilibrium between ‘action and passion,’ as between ‘perception and sensation’. 
(OT 155) 
Derrida’s remarks on Ravaisson here correspond to his overall project in On Touching.  The 
sense of touch is what links all metaphysical oppositions, driving all totalising efforts in 
philosophy. It is a very simple point.  All beings have to touch each other for any being to be 
grounded in a prior presence. This is the touch which Derrida is trying to deconstruct. It is touch 
in the pejorative sense.  It is the touch which is virtual and spiritual, miraculously animating all 
organic life from the simple to the complex. It is the touch that can be at all places at once, the 
touch that is indivisible by necessity, literally overflowing any individual bodily affects.  In 
essence, singular events must be habituated to ‘touch’ along a metaphysical continuum. For 
Derrida: 
Now, as effort cannot be dissociated from touch, touch at the same time fulfils it and covers 
the entire field of experience, every interval and every degree between passivity and 
activity.  Touch [tact], the eminent sense of effort, is also the name of all the senses: “Effort 
is fulfilled in touch [tact]. Touch [tact] extends from the extremity of passion to the 
extremity of action.  In its development it comprises all their intermediate degrees, and, at 
every degree, it bears out their law of reciprocity. (OT, 155) 
Ravaisson’s ontology crystallizes Derrida’s suspicion towards forms of spiritual Vitalism, or more 
precisely, ‘biological continuisms,’ which throughout the philosophical tradition are conceived 
as ‘postulated indivisibility.’ (OT, 155) This is the hidden indivisible presence of Ravaisson’s 
metaphysics.14 Derrida is thus not just deconstructing touch just in relation to subjectivity.  If 
Derrida is doing anything in On Touching, he is demonstrating that all touch is essentially 
divided, cut and spaced, and temporalised.  In a strong sense this undermines much of what 
Ravaisson does, since there cannot be an absolute continuity between the most complex and 
the simplest beings.  
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Indeed, the five ‘tangents’ of the hand around which the text of On Touching is organized is 
designed to disrupt the continuity of touch.15  They attempt an intervention. In sum, they 
present a meta-reflection, a performative presentation of how touch is never indivisible, of how 
touch is always subject to différance and can thus never sustain only itself.  All touch is not auto-
affection: it is hetero-affection, and therefore it is irreducibly mediated.16 Derrida consolidates 
his analysis by arguing that Ravaisson’s ontology is, as such, a metaphysics of touch.  Derrida 
sympathetically cites Jean Luc Nancy here, commending Nancy’s break from hapto-centric 
metaphysics, providing a discourse about touch that is not spiritual and indivisible and “...is not 
intuitionistic, continuistic, homogeneistic, or indivisibilistic.” (156)  Nancy disrupts spiritual 
Vitalism through “...sharing, parting, partitioning, and discontinuity, interruption, caesura – in 
a word, syncope.” (156)  All of these conceptual tropes represent limitation, finitude and 
disruption.  Moreover, these concepts are more specifically related to the notion of disrupting 
the tradition of ‘my body.’ Deconstruction in its most radical expression must be concerned 
with a general theory of bodies external to instants of self-expression. There must be limits, 
therefore, which compromise the movement of touched bodies.  Touch cannot be just 
unstructured, spontaneous creativity. 
In terms of touch, then, what is most important for Derrida is that the différance of touch is 
subject from the outset to an originary technics, one that is irreducible to both nature and spirit, 
and one which, following Nancy, must be considered within the remit of the local, the modal 
and the fractal. (156)    Ravaisson’s vitalistic commitment to a dynamic monism notifies us of 
another central problem which Derrida holds with Of Habit, one that is also typical of many 
vitalist thinkers. Vitalism negatively defines the human being as that which is resistant to the 
mechanical.  Now, this is complicated by thinkers like Bergson and his recognition of the 
intransigence of space but ultimately, for the vitalist, the existence of any being is dependent 
on a prior creative force which animates inert or dead matter.  This is also the case for Ravaisson 
where vital and spiritual movement and transformation are overvalued as forms of a generative 
and creative unity.  They amount to a ’top-down’ or ‘creationist’ understanding of ontological 
individuation.  Habit is a power that stretches all the way down to the most small and all the 
way up to divine immanence.  
While Ravaisson is committed to explaining the importance of habit for the individuation of 
being, one of his primary aims is to render apparent the unity and continuity underlying any 
limits and distinctions of individuated bodies.  This undermines Derrida’s commitment to limits, 
the syncope and finitude.  Ravaisson’s ‘metaphysics of touch’ undermines the very possibility 
of existents becoming localised, since they must rely on an ideal form of Being effectively doing 
the creative work for them.  While for Ravaisson organic beings are certainly limited and 
oriented towards functions and purposes, but despite this, “nature makes continuity concrete, 
as the plenitude of reality.” (OH, 77) For Ravaisson, there is a singular power which animates 
all.  So while local habituations such as consciousness, motor activity and perception are in 
some sense infinitely divisible, they all take their energy and dynamism from a prior and 
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inexhaustible unity of nature. (OH, 75) Ravaisson’s ontology is based on unified but qualitative 
differences of degree of one and the same monistic substance: “[b]etween the ultimate depths 
of nature and the highest point of reflective freedom, there are an infinite number of degrees 
measuring the development of and the same power, as one rises through them, extension – the 
condition of knowledge – increases with the distinction and the interval of the opposites.” (OH, 
76) The notion of touch must be re-coordinated in order to resist Ravaisson’s magical and 
miraculous prime touching which generates all bodies. 
Derrida sets out to refigure the concept of touch within the logic of hetero-affection. 
Deconstructive touching is thus wholly resistant to the idea of a miraculous ‘biological 
continuism’ between all and any extremities; the metaphysics of touch is impossible tout court 
since auto-affection is impossible.  There can then be no ‘the’ sense of touch.17  As a 
consequence of this, it must always be subject to spacing (or an ecart).18 (OT, 156) Touch is only 
ever the effect of spatial and temporal tracing. Touch is différance, and is therefore spatialized 
and temporalised.  Indeed, this is why Derrida complains about Ravaisson’s suggestion that the 
‘interval’ fills up. (OT, 156) The interval refers to the limits of body, large or small. For Derrida, 
the Ravaissonian impulse entails a vital force that is a well of fecundity overflowing any limits, 
differences or demarcations, undermining the relative integrity of a body.  There is no real 
ground for spacing or interval, since by definition all bodies are transcended by the fecund and 
overflowing hierarchy of creative spirit.19   
In essence, the fundamental philosophical problem surrounding the question of limits and 
monism is: How does one resolve the paradox of divisibility and indivisiblity? For Derrida, 
Ravaisson’s most prized concept of habit is, by necessity, always already inhabited by the 
pharmakon. The pharmakon is an ambiguous term denoting both poison and remedy. The term 
is metonymic, denoting salvation, sacrifice, curse, and blessedness. What attracts Derrida to 
this concept is the logic which underpins it.  The pharmakon is precisely hetero-affective, since 
the limit of an identity always implies a mutual implication with what is external to it. Habit 
must therefore negate the organic to allow a transition to life, but this in turn is exposed to the 
limits which the material world imposes upon it. An optimum level of habituality is always 
haunted by an irretrievable other, the life of a habit can only be structured in concert with the 
inorganic matter it emerges from. Since there can be no radical separation of the two, this 
means there can be only relatively localised limits which disrupt biological indivisibility:   
I ask whether there is any pure auto-affection of the touching or the touched, and 
therefore any pure, immediate experience of the purely proper body, the body 
proper that is living, purely living.  Or if, on the contrary, this experience is not, at 
the very least, already haunted, perhaps even constitutively haunted, by some 
hetero affection related to spacing and then to visible spatiality – where an 
intruder may come through, a host, wished or unwished for, a spare and auxiliary 
other, or a parasite to be rejected, a pharmakon that already having at its disposal 
12 
 
a dwelling in this place inhabits one’s heart of hearts [tout for intérieur] as a ghost. 
[OT, 179-180] 
In rather disparaging terms, Derrida suggests that Ravaisson’s top-down spiritual model of 
limitless creation is no more than a ‘magic trick,’ brought into being by a ‘miraculous’ grace, 
where divisibility by dint of some ontological ‘confusion,’ or sleight of hand, is nullified,  allowing 
a moment when ‘the divisible becomes indivisible.’ The metaphysics of life therefore remains 
coextensive with the metaphysics of touch.  (OT, 156) This amounts to a dynamic monism, albeit 
a monism nonetheless, against which Derrida exhorts us to be vigilant.  This is a monism in 
which all extremities of Being touch each other.  Ravaisson says as much: “Continuity implies 
the indivisible middle term, where, across the entire milieu, at whatever distance from either 
of the extremities, the extremities touch one another, and contraries merge.” (OH, 75) In such 
an ontology there is no beginning or end, only the differential intensities of a single but unitary 
substance. 
For Ravaisson, as Derrida observes, biological life aspires to spirit; it tends towards the life of 
the spirit.  From the origin to the end in a diversity of creative fecundity, life “...precedes, 
traverses, and overflows the humanity of the human without ceasing to inspire or aspire to it, 
and therefore to finalize it.” (OT, 157)  To argue in this register is to argue within the Aristotelian 
register of final cause, wherein the telos is the motivating end or desire which causes an object 
to assume its own individuated form.  For Derrida, this again repeats the metaphysics of 
presence, wherein we can have no sense of touch or relationality which does not infinitely 
spread out beyond itself.  All singular bodies, all entities which are wholly other, only exist by 
virtue of some quasi-divine creative force.  Endorsing this creative force can only lead to 
problematic conclusions for Derrida; it means that Ravaisson’s creative force is an immanent 
God, one that is intimate to our being.20 Nature itself is, as Ravaisson puts it, a prevenient grace.  
What we are, the habits which constitute us are no more than instantiations of a dynamic and 
creative force operating throughout the cosmos.  If deconstruction is to be thought of as an 
event, one that is singular and yet open to incessant differentiation and transformation, it is 
therefore incumbent on deconstructive thinking to assert that it offers a more consistent 
account of the formation of beings and objects.   
Section 3: Localization, Originary Technicity and the Emergent Structure of Life 
Deconstruction must be thought of in terms of a minimal form of mechanical ‘structuration,’ or 
a structuration that repeats in a novelised way. The concept of ‘originary technicity’ brings to 
fulfilment the importance of plurality and hetero-affection, and only serves to underline the 
radical divergence of Derrida and Vitalism.  Following Derrida’s commentary on Ravaisson in On 
Touching, deconstruction must reject spiritualistic trans-personalism in favour of singularity, 
alterity and finitude as the irreducible coordinates of thought. This however needs to be fleshed 
out in terms of the understanding of event and machine.  The calculability, repetition and 
structure of technicity is the minimal structural defence which allows any entity to 
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spontaneously emerge. Such an event must be locally individuated and simultaneously 
violable.21 The insertion of death in life by inscription, techne, writing and trace is decisive with 
regard the question of life. There can be no pure life, or life that is only life itself. Life cannot be 
a hierarchical bestowal of life without already being infected by alterity. It is the 
misunderstanding of such a hetero-affection of life that Derrida has combated from beginning 
to end. Life cannot be separated from inscription and technicity since the purely biological 
needs to draw support from all manner of inscriptions from technology, convention and history. 
In his bellwether article “Différance," the concept of life and humanism cannot be radically split 
but mutually complicated. Différance is explicitly not physis, or life, but an instance of life 
whereby "all the others of physis—tekhnē, nomos, thesis, society, freedom, history, mind, 
etc.—as physis differed and deferred, or as physis differing and deferring.”22 As mentioned, in 
his Dissemination, Derrida stresses technē as central to his critique of Platonic repetition 
(mimesis). In “Plato’s Pharmacy,” the pharmakon is a constitutive violence, one that destabilizes 
the organizational force of any living identity. As Derrida puts it: “It would be better to assert 
that the written traces no longer even belong to the order of the phusis, since they are not 
alive….They do violence to the natural, autonomous organization of the mnēmnē, in which 
phusis and psuchē are opposed.” 23  No organizational structure can autonomously generate 
itself since this can only take place heteronymously. Originary technicity is the promissory 
minimal structure required to ensure iteration and relation of any life form. The vitalist impetus 
is to ensure the opposite. This is why Derrida’s criticizes Ravaisson’s vitalistic account habit, 
since it is also a species of pharmakon, where habits generate their own relations.  On a 
deconstructive account, habit can only truly originate via a memory of the past divided by the 
contingency of the future. Habits do not structurally gather and congeal as potently as 
Ravaisson would suggest, since every habit is susceptible to contamination by innumerable 
hosts from convention, to law, to freedom and technology. Habit would thus require prosthesis 
of its own. Habit cannot only be itself, since this would mean it would dictate and passively 
resist anything it came in contact with. Instead, habit requires originary technicity to 
compensate for an absence; with regard habit originary technicity is the minimal structure 
required for the iteration of a habit. 
Originary technicity completes the habituality of bodies by inserting an automatic, necessary, 
and deathly apparatus at the core of any vital spontaneity.  Originary technicity delimits 
biological habituality. For deconstruction, the importance of originary technicity is that it allows 
us to think precisely the formal conditions for the existence of singular but relational identities.  
If we turn to Derrida’s long essay ‘Typewriter Ribbon,’ technicity is revealed as the minimal 
‘structure’ of necessity in beings.  In this essay, Derrida makes occasional interventions on 
behalf of the machine. He is not interested in separating nature from technology, nor is he 
claiming that thought should be governed by mechanical necessity, or by the vital resistance of 
life to mechanization. Instead, Derrida puts it thus:  
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Intentionality forecloses the machine itself.  If, then, some machinality (repetition, 
caculability, inorganic matter of the body) intervenes in a  performative event, it 
is always as an accidental, extrinsic, and parasitical element, in truth a 
pathological, mutilating, or even mortal element.  Here again, to think both the 
machine and the performative event together remains a monstrosity to come, an 
impossible event.  Therefore the only possible event. But it would be an event that, 
this time, would no longer happen without the machine.  Rather, it would happen 
by the machine.24 
And later: 
Surviving it, being destined to this sur-vival, to this excess over present life the 
oeuvre as trace implies from the outset the structure of this sur-vival, that is, what 
cuts the oeuvre off from the operation.  This cut assures it a sort of archival 
independence or autonomy that is quasi-machinelike (not machinelike but quasi-
machinelike), a power of repetition, repeatability, iterability, serial and prosthetic 
substitution of self for self. (WA, 133) 
Taken together, these quotes show us that to think deconstruction as an event requires thinking 
both the machine and the natural at once.  For Derrida, the most monstrous thing of all is the 
formal repetition of death as alterity. The machine can never be present to itself.  All bodies 
present themselves as negated, and they have an iterable and substitutable structure, as 
defined by Derrida in the above quotation.  Many of Derrida’s later essays and interviews are 
committed to this type of originary technicity. Best summed up in Richard Beardsworth’s by 
now seminal interview “Nietzsche and the Machine,” we see Derrida unambiguously 
committing to understand in deconstruction as a form of reflection on the complication of life 
and death in nature and artifice.  Deconstructive difference requires mechanic repetition to 
renew itself.  As Derrida puts it to Beardsworth:  
In response to your two questions, I would first focus on what Heidegger says about 
the concept of life, since any living being, in fact, undoes the opposition between 
physis and techne. As a self-relation, as activity and reactivity, as differential force, 
and repetition, life is always already inhabited by technicization.  The relation 
between physis and technics is not an opposition; from the very first there is 
instrumentalisation [dès l’origine il ya de l’instrumentalisation.]  The term instrument 
is inappropriate in the context of originary technicity.  Whatever, a prosthetic 
strategy of repetition inhabits the very moment of life: life is a process of self-
replacement, the handing-down of life is a mechanike, a form of tehnics. Not only, 
then, is technics not in opposition to life, it also haunts it from the very beginning.25 
Nature, or any form of vital spirit, is contaminated by a techne of bodies to its core.26  Derrida 
argues this in order to undermine the binary separation of nature and the machine. Originary 
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technicity commits to the logic of supplementarity, iterability, and arche-writing; these are 
concepts which are all committed to the effort to collapse the binary opposition between the 
technical and the non-technical.  In the formation of bodies, technical structuration is always 
already a decisive moment in the freedom of nature. The presence of any being is a form of 
techno-creativity, a logic in which the ruthless machine gives bodies a minimal and, 
metaphorically speaking, skeletal form.  Death is the repetition of techne; death allows all 
identities to be other than themselves, thereby allowing them to exist. All habits are thus 
essentially a letting-die of themselves in an effort to repeat numerically: to give birth to new 
creations.  Deconstruction defines the conditions of the constitution of any body.  Such a 
constitution always already presupposes a relational movement.  There can be no body, 
irrespective of its size, its magnitude, or its place in a hierarchy, which can be thought of as a 
pure body that grounds all others.  The extension of the habitual body to beings in general is 
then an over-determination on Ravaisson’s part.  This begs the question as to how can we think 
bodies emerging into being.  The constitution of any ‘proper’ or ‘pure’ body for deconstruction 
must be relational tout court.  This is because any passage outside a body is only related to its 
contextual environment. This stands in opposition to Ravaisson, in whose thought all beings 
which exist are related along a continuum.  For us, this means more decisively that any 
relational force takes place through alterity, spacing, absence and death. The relation between 
any bodies must participate in the realm of the inanimate, the dead, and the brute affectivity 
of materiality.   
In terms of the comparison between Ravaisson and Derrida, we can now see that 
deconstruction always remains prior to habit with where being is effectively de-habitualized.  In 
this register, habit cannot be considered as an abstract logic of being itself, because in it, there 
can be no absolute being from which all other beings are derived. We can thus begin to see how 
some proximity arises between Derrida’s deconstruction and Ravaisson’s analysis of time and 
space.  There are two distinct points at play here.  Firstly, this proximity is evident in Ravaisson’s 
amalgamation of time and space in the contraction of habit.  Secondly, it can be seen in 
Ravaisson’s account of the adaptability of individuated beings in relation to their environment.  
The first issue goes right to heart of the question of difference and sameness; the second 
isolates Derrida’s commitment to singularity.27  Bodies are singular and novel, as well as having 
the capacity to be iterable.  What can we learn, then, from the defining contrasts between 
Ravaisson and Derrida? Using Derrida as a springboard, we can see that Ravaisson’s conception 
of habit is one which is about the formal conditions for any body’s being (l’état d’une existence), 
as much as it pertains to the empirical content of that being. Indeed, Ravaisson’s main aim is 
not to describe particular acquired habits, but to posit the very ontological emergence of habit 
itself.   
Both permanence and change are essential to Ravaisson’s abstract form of being.  If there is a 
being which exists, then by necessity its conditions are of permanence and change, irrespective 
of the empirical content of particular acquired habits. Ravaisson thus subscribes to a type of 
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transcendental ontology.28  For him, temporalisation and spatialisation are mutually entwined. 
Space is that abstract structuring of an entity which allows permanence: it allows beings to 
remain, whereas time forces beings to change.  Any being therefore exists in a fragile state of 
existence, or manner of existence, strictly grounded on a spatial subsistence which remains for 
a potential change.  Carlisle and Sinclair describe this best:  “habit involves a relationship to 
both the past and the future, since it subsists beyond the change which brought it about,” and 
thus it “remains for a possible change.  This ‘remaining’ for a future change takes the form of 
anticipating (prévenir)...”29  In addition, the other important consequence of this ‘remaining’ is 
that habit operates in relation to a principle of localisation.  This is a disposition oriented 
towards relative changes.  This means that habit cannot change into just anything, because it 
demands a relative consistency in relation to the actuality of changes.  This is an absolute 
necessity for allowing any being to cohere in the face of perpetual transformation.  Therefore, 
only certain bodies can have disposition in proportion to relative changes. What is relevant for 
our analysis is Ravaisson’s commitment to a principle of minimal consistency.  Any habit is 
singular, but it need not at least in itself be absolute.  Habit is a relative change existing within 
specific environmental conditions.   
Ravaisson’s analysis corresponds up to a point with Martin Hägglund’s development of 
deconstruction as a form of radical atheism. Hägglund’s interpretation of Derrida as a radial 
atheist rests on a commitment to taking Derrida at his word, and removing from deconstructive 
thought all vestiges of eternity and onto-theology.  This requires for Hägglund a commitment 
to a re-writing of Hegelian negative dialectics and a commitment to understanding identities 
logically as a dialectic of infinite finitudes. For Hägglund, Derrida subverts totalisation by arguing 
that ‘bad infinity’ is ‘time’ as such.  Totality is refuted from its inception for Derrida, since there 
is a perpetual disruption of negative infinity.  Différance is defined as both spatial and temporal 
displacement; différance is the temporal deferring and the spatial differing of all identities.  For 
Hägglund, “Totality is not an unreachable idea but self-refuting as such, since everything is 
subjected to temporal alteration that prevents it from ever being in itself.  Alterity is thus 
irreducible because of the negative infinity of finitude, which undermines any possible totality 
from the outset.”30 Following Derrida in Margins of Philosophy, for Hägglund, time is spacing.31  
In a similar way, space holds a retaining structure which combines with time, which has an 
altering capacity. Hägglund, however, extends the conceptual field for thinking deconstruction 
as the formal conditions of any event without exception. Deconstruction names, in Hägglund’s 
terms, the ‘minimal support’ which allows a being to remain despite temporal alteration.32 This 
has three consequences. Firstly, an event must submit to what Derrida calls the trace structure, 
which is to say that for any being to exist, it must remain dependent on the constitution of time, 
and time logically delimits totality.  Secondly, this also requires that there must be a minimal 
spatial structure which retains a past for a future, and provides a minimal identity.33  The trace 
is thus characterised by the ability to remain relative to what is relatively enduring.  Thirdly, the 
logic of trace would require some principle of localisation or singularisation.   
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The logic of a singular event gives a skeletal contour to the structure of an event. The formal 
conditions of localisation require by definition that a being remains relatively localised.  Any 
existent must remain tied to localised events while remaining dependent on some form of 
substance drawn from the immediate environment.34 For Derrida, there must be some 
substantial materiality that presents the limits of a body existing, since its organisation relies on 
a minimal form of structural integrity.  This minimal form is an absolute necessity for a body to 
exist, since it provides a nominal structure which impedes a being from turning into just 
anything.   
This explains why deconstruction is always a question of singularity as well as a dependent and 
radical alterity. The being of any body, of any singular object, must be characterised as a violable 
milieu.  It must be relatively contingent, not absolute.  If there was an absolute relation between 
all beings then we would be on the same terms as Ravaisson’s monism.  For Derrida, if there 
was such an absolute relation then there could thus be no apposite localization, since any 
singular individuated being would not be individuated by definition, existing only as condition 
of the continuum of the prior absolute. Correlatively, singularity is also the effect of a trace and 
there is no absolute individuation.  If there is only localisation then there would be no relation 
between objects within a locale.  Consequently, deconstruction implies that a body exists 
minimally within itself, while remaining susceptible to relations within its immediate 
environment.  For deconstruction, no event or body can exist without drawing some formal 
existential provisions from whatever existents are within its material and immediate 
environment.   
Here we can ultimately see the clear difference between Derrida and Ravaisson. Habit for 
Ravaisson draws sustenance from anywhere, in effect: from any degree along the continuum 
of nature.  Deconstruction insists that things cannot draw on an infinite amount of substantial 
material, but only a relatively local amount.  Therefore, the formal condition of any event, for 
deconstruction, is that it necessitates a proportionality of bodies with regard to their immediate 
environment.  Thus, the existence of a body is based on a minimal unity drawing proportional 
sustenance from the dimensionality, action and spatiality of its relation to relatively local 
bodies.  All bodies that exist are individuated in relation to their environment.  They cannot 
relate to all other beings in the cosmos at the same time.  Deconstruction thus offers an 
explanation of the singularity and the relative ‘form’ of a body.  The deconstructive body is a 
contingent body which is adaptive to the optimum and congenial conditions in which it involves 
itself.  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, while Ravaisson presents nature as a vitalistic continuum, Derrida challenges this 
in a number of contexts including subjectivity, perception and the metaphysical temptation to 
derive all things from prior indivisible principles. As I have shown in this article, for Ravaisson 
the dimensions of things could be divided between that which is active and that which is 
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passive. Passivity exists insofar as things are dependent on their relation to bodies within their 
immediate environment, and active exists insofar as they are self-generated. As we saw in 
Ravaisson’s analysis of habit, is a biological one which has a wide-ranging application, but it is 
one which cannot found thought from its inception.  Deconstruction, as I have shown, is 
required to ground the prior formation of habit.  Habit, to be habit, must conform to différance 
as temporalisation and spacing, even if Ravaisson goes some way towards explaining time and 
space in his theory of habit.  The spacing and temporalisation of deconstruction are prior 
requisites for a body to accrue habituation: they are bodies’ conditions of possibility.  In a similar 
but qualified way, Derrida characterises space as the relative stability of a being, while time 
characterises the ability to transform and move.  There is no distinction between the formal yet 
fragile structures of living beings and those of everything else. For this simple reason, Derrida 
can never be considered a vitalist.  All existents are formed through both structure and 
contingency, and thus through life and death. The central function of death and necessity shows 
why Derrida places such an emphasis on ‘originary technicity.’  There must be some 
informational structure or process at play which provides a minimal prosthesis or localised form 
of enclosure to bodies, even if they are at one and the same time susceptible to contamination 
and alterity. 
Habit is, as Ravaisson argues, a second nature. This definition implies a form of unconscious 
automaticity.  Deconstruction cannot subscribe wholeheartedly to such automaticity as 
automaticity is limited to the organic.  For Ravaisson, nature certainly engages in self-alteration.  
However, every alteration or modification is but a degree of change of nature itself.  Habit thus 
cannot transcend nature, and as an activity habit remains wholly immanent to nature.  Derrida 
cannot embrace the natural immanence such an argument presupposes, in which all bodies are 
on the scale of a totalized, albeit dynamic, plane of nature. Ravaisson’s problem is that he relies 
on the isomorphy of habit and Being.   Derrida never fully abjures the thought that right at the 
heart of nature there is some level of technicity.  Nature always requires some repetitive, 
technical, and repetitive self-altering ability; bodies cannot remain separate from some 
minimally technical or quasi-mechanical structure.  Derrida’s philosophical achievement is to 
begin an extended theory of the differential organization of bodies.  He recognises, in 
contradiction to the metaphysical creationism of vitalist spirituality, that life does not generate 
beings on its own. Life as much as anything else is vulnerable and fragile; it is dependent on 
quasi-mechanical impetuses that require the inorganic to adjust itself in order to procreate 
itself. Hence at the core of any organic life is death, and at the core of inorganic death is life. 
The ability of a body to relate or to interact relies ultimately on the ability of an object to change 
its basic formal structure as well as its altering content. What Derrida does abjure, however, is 
the modern impetus in which system is defined by totalisation within the domain of ontology 
but such totalisation is always impossible.  Thus, if deconstruction is to begin to offer a general 
theory of bodies, it must begin to argue for the singular way its composite material elements 
are related, interconnected or organized.  This is why it must always be remembered that 
Derrida always retains a guarded fidelity towards system and organisation. There is always an 
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injunction to coherence, gathering, and form while at one at the same time dissolution, 
decomposition and de-structuring.  Deconstruction as originary technics provides the general 
requirements for any and all bodies emerging.  When Derrida does bear a fidelity to 
systematicity, it is one founded on the repetition of an irreducible alterity of bodies.  
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